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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremy Cook contends the district court erred when it denied his Motion for
Reconsideration of the order summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition. In that
motion, Mr. Cook alleged one of his appointed post-conviction attorneys had been
completely absent in representing him. He asserts the district court erred by analyzing
that motion under I.R.C.P. 59(e) (hereinafter, Rule 59(e)) when it should have been
considered under Rule 60(b). Because of that error, this Court should vacate the order
denying Mr. Cook’s Motion for Reconsideration and remand this case for further
proceedings. This is true even if this Court considers the merits of Mr. Cook’s claims
under Rule 60(b) rather than just remanding the case for the district court to make
findings under the proper rule, since the record shows Mr. Cook has valid claims for
relief under Rule 60(b).
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Cook was charged with felony driving under
the influence (DUI). (R., p.40.) The charges arose when an officer saw a motorcyclist
driving in an allegedly-reckless manner outside the Rodeo Bar (accelerating, jumping
the curb, and riding on the back tire only, for example). (Exhibits, p.39 (police reports
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attached to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI)).)1 The motorcyclist
fled when the officer attempted to initiate a traffic stop. (Exhibits, p.39.) The officer
noted the motorcyclist was wearing black sunglasses, gloves, and a dark sweatshirt
with lettering on it. (Exhibits, p.39.) The officer also observed the motorcycle did not
have a rear license plate.

(Exhibits, p.39.)

When the motorcyclist pulled into the

backyard of a home, the pursuing officer drove away from the home in an effort to flank
the suspect. (Exhibits, pp.39, 41.)
Meanwhile, a second officer approached the home and encountered one of the
residents, Nathan Ames, who was driving up on his own motorcycle. (Exhibits, p.41.)
At that point, the second officer saw a second man in a dark sweatshirt with lettering
and jeans come out of a shop on the property. (Exhibits, p.41.) Despite the officer’s
instructions, the second man ran. (Exhibits, p.41.) However, the officer stayed to talk
with Mr. Ames, who said he expected someone to have been in his shop and that one
of several motorcycles in and around the shop – one whose engine felt hot to the officer
– belonged to Mr. Cook. (Exhibits, p.41.)
Shortly thereafter, the officer who had initially pursued the motorcycle saw a man
running toward him from the direction of the home.

(Exhibit, p.39.)

Believing the

running man was wearing the same sweatshirt the motorcyclist had been, the officer

1

The PSI from the underlying criminal case was incorporated into the post-conviction
record via the State’s Answer and the appellate record via the Idaho Supreme Court’s
order taking judicial notice of the record prepared for a direct appeal in the underlying
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arrested the running man. (Exhibits, p.39.) He also reported that the running man, who
was ultimately identified as Mr. Cook, had a pair of sunglasses and a pair of gloves in
his hand at the time.2 (Exhibits, p.40.) A subsequent breath test indicated Mr. Cook
had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .113. (Exhibits, p.42.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Cook pled guilty to felony DUI.
(See R., pp.44-55.) The district court imposed and executed a sentence with a unified
term of ten years, with four years fixed, on Mr. Cook.

(R., pp.56-57.)

Mr. Cook

challenged his sentence as being excessive, as well as the denial of his subsequent
motion for leniency, on direct appeal, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s orders in an unpublished decision. State v. Cook, 2016 Unpublished Opinion
No.372 (Ct. App. 2016).
Mr. Cook also filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief timely from the
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.5-10.) In his verified petition, Mr. Cook made several
allegations that his trial counsel, Jeffery Nona,3 had been ineffective, including that Mr.

case. (R., pp.37, 232.) A copy of the PSI is provided in the PDF document “Cook PSI
& exhibits #44229” (hereinafter, “Exhibits”).
2
In a subsequent, pro se motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35, Mr. Cook argued
that the description of the suspect’s clothing did not match his, and noted that no gloves
or sunglasses were in his property at the jail. (R., pp.59-60.)
3
Mr. Cook has been represented by several different attorneys during this case.
Relevant to this appeal are his trial counsel in the underlying criminal case, Jeffery
Nona, his initial post-conviction counsel, Randall Grove, who withdrew due to a conflict
prior to summary dismissal, his conflict post-conviction counsel, Michael Nelson, who
represented Mr. Cook during the summary dismissal process, and his substitute postconviction counsel, Steve Carpenter, who handled the Motion for Reconsideration.

3

Nona “refused to examine evidence; and refused to speak or listen to witnesses of
petitioner” (R., p.7), “refused to investigate the case and proffered no defense strategy
at all” (R., p.8), and “hid favorable evidence from the petitioner that would have shown
the petitioner not guilty of the charge of D.U.I.” (R., p.9 (emphasis from original).) In his
affidavit in support of the petition, Mr. Cook further alleged that Mr. Nona “refused to
even speak to my witnesses about this case that would prove my innocence.”
(R., p.14.) He also attested, in regard to the plea process, Mr. Nona “told me to agree
with everything the judge said.” (R., p.13.) The district court appointed counsel to
represent Mr. Cook in the post-conviction proceedings. (R., pp.21-22, 89.)
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, arguing that Mr. Cook’s petition
only presented bare and conclusory allegations rather than sufficient argument or
evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact on any of his claims.
(R., pp.101 09.) The district court subsequently filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the
petition which grouped and addressed Mr. Cook’s various claims. (R., pp.118-25; see
also 2/8/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.7-15 (the prosecutor incorporating the “more in depth”
justifications for dismissal articulated in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss into the State’s
motion for summary dismissal “for failure to support the petition as alleged”).) For
example, in regard to Mr. Cook’s allegations that Mr. Nona had failed to investigate the
case and speak to witnesses, the district court explained Mr. Cook had not identified the
theory of defense Mr. Nona should have pursued, the witnesses he should have
consulted, or the evidence those witnesses would have provided. (R., pp.122-23.) The
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district court also indicated that Mr. Cook’s answers in the guilty plea questionnaire
disproved his allegations in that regard. (R., pp.123-24.) However, it did not address
Mr. Cook’s allegation that his attorney told him to just agree with everything the judge
said as it related to the plea process. (See generally, R., pp.118-25.)
Subsequently, Mr. Cook’s initial post-conviction attorney, Mr. Grove, moved to
withdraw from the case, asserting a conflict had arisen between himself and Mr. Cook in
regard to how to proceed with this case. (R., pp.127-28.) Mr. Cook also filed a pro se
motion requesting appointment of conflict counsel. (R., pp.129-32.) Mr. Cook filed two
sworn statements with his motion, one from his father, Robert Cook, and one from his
friend, Nathan Ames, revealing the evidence he was requesting be filed, but which Mr.
Grove was refusing to file, in support of his petition. (See R., pp.134-45.)
Mr. Ames’ statement, which was initially made in support of a bar complaint
against trial counsel, asserted that Mr. Nona was supposed to have interviewed
Mr. Ames, as Mr. Ames could refute certain points of evidence in the case. (R., p.144.)
For example, Mr. Ames asserted he could refute the assertion that “I told the police that
[Mr. Cook] was in fact driving.” (R., p.144.)
Robert Cook’s affidavit made various assertions, including that Mr. Cook’s
motorcycle had a rear license plate, and that there were witnesses who could testify that
Mr. Cook had not have been driving the motorcycle the police had been pursuing, as he
had been working on a motorcycle at Mr. Ames’ house at the time. (R., p.140.)

5

The district court appointed conflict counsel, Mr. Nelson.

(R., p.153-55.)

Mr. Nelson filed a motion to extend the time to file information in support of the petition,
in which he stated Mr. Cook had several affidavits he wanted Mr. Nelson to review and
file, “and Counsel needs an additional week to submit the information to the court.”
(R., p.156.) The district court granted that motion. (R., p.158.) However, Mr. Nelson
ultimately failed to file any additional information. (See generally R.) Instead, at a
status conference, Mr. Nelson represented that the affidavits Mr. Cook wanted filed
“would be affidavits containing hearsay. I just spoke to his previous lawyer. I know that I
then filed a motion for additional time. Upon my research, I didn’t see any additional
information” to file in support of the petition. (2/8/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.20-25.) Because no
additional information was filed, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Cook’s
petition for the reasons articulated in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss. (2/8/16 Tr., p.5,
Ls.3-17; R., pp.162-70.)

Immediately thereafter, it issued the Final Judgment.

(R., p.172.)
That same day, Mr. Cook filed a pro se notice requesting an extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration. (R., pp.174-79.) In that motion, he made several
allegations regarding Mr. Nelson, including that Mr. Nelson had not been
communicating with him or his potential witnesses during the post-conviction process.
(See R., pp.174-79.) The district court did not rule on that motion. (See generally R.)
Approximately one month later, Mr. Carpenter substituted in as counsel for
Mr. Cook.

(R., p.191.)

Four days later, Mr. Carpenter filed a “Motion for
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Reconsideration,” requesting the district court reconsider “its Order of Dismissal”
because, inter alia, Mr. Nelson had not presented evidence in support of Mr. Cook’s
petition, and had not, upon Mr. Cook’s request, filed a motion for reconsideration in
accordance with I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). (R., pp.194-99.) In his affidavit in support of the
Motion for Reconsideration, Mr. Cook alleged that Mr. Nelson had not been
communicating with him during the post-conviction proceedings. (R., p.198.) He also
attested he had left a voicemail at Mr. Nelson’s office after the hearing on the State’s
motion to dismiss, but before the written order had been entered and “instruct[ed] him to
file a motion for reconsideration within the time allowed by statute.” (R., p.198.) The
motion to reconsider was also supported by an affidavit from Louannie Stambaugh
(Mr. Cook’s sister (R., p.180)), as well as a second round of affidavits from Robert Cook
and Mr. Ames. 4 (4/21/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.11-13.)
Mr. Ames stated in his affidavit that he had met Mr. Cook at the Sportsman pub
on the evening in question, and that, when Mr. Cook left, Mr. Ames thought it was to go
back to Mr. Ames’ house, which was not far away, as Mr. Cook had left his truck there.
(Aug. p.4.) Mr. Ames left the pub twenty minutes later and met the officers who were at
his home. (Aug. p.4.) He stated Mr. Cook then came out of his shop, as if headed
toward the restroom. (Aug. p.4.) Mr. Ames asserted that, to his knowledge, Mr. Cook

4

The affidavit from Ms. Stambaugh appears in the record at R., p.180. The affidavits of
Mr. Ames and Robert Cook have been subsequently augmented to the appellate
record. (See Aug. pp.4-58-17; Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Renewed
Motion to Augment, dated January 5, 2017.)
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had never been to the Rodeo Bar because it was not the type of bar they enjoyed
patronizing. (Aug. p.4.) He also asserted that, despite approaching Mr. Nona about this
case, Mr. Nona did not interview him because “none of that was necessary” “we will just
let this case resolve itself.” (Aug. p.4.)
Robert Cook’s affidavit also asserted, inter alia, that his son had never been to
the Rodeo Bar, again due to the bar’s atmosphere. (Aug. p.10.) He stated that Mr.
Nona had given him the impression that he had talked with Mr. Ames, but he later
learned this was not the case. (Aug. pp.10-11.) He reaffirmed that his son’s motorcycle
had a rear license plate. (Aug. p.13.) He also stated that there had not been gloves or
sunglasses in his son’s property when he picked that property up from the jail.
(Aug. p.14.)
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Cook’s Motion for Reconsideration. At
that hearing, Mr. Carpenter argued Mr. Cook had identified various pieces of evidence –
about his whereabouts at the relevant time, the description of the motorcycle, the
clothing he was wearing, and the items in his possession – which, if they had been
presented in support of his petition for post-conviction relief, would have established
genuine issues of material fact concerning his claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.

(4/21/16 Tr., p.4, L.19 - p.5, L.1.)

Mr. Carpenter also asserted, due to

Mr. Nelson’s failure to present that additional information in support of the petition,
Mr. Cook’s petition had been improperly summarily dismissed. (4/21/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.26.) Additionally, Mr. Carpenter noted Mr. Ames and Robert Cook, among others, were
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present at the hearing and were prepared to give additional testimony in support of the
motion for reconsideration. (4/21/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.11-19.)
The district court refused to allow Mr. Cook to present the testimony of his
witnesses. (4/21/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.21-22.) Instead, it concluded, “This is a motion to
reconsider a motion to amend pleadings under [Rule] 59.” (4/21/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.23-24.)
It proceeded to deny that motion, finding no errors of law or fact surrounding the
decision to summarily dismiss the petition. (4/21/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.8-11.) In its written
order, the district court also concluded, “Petitioner has failed to sufficiently support his
Motion for Reconsideration.” (R., p.209.) Mr. Cook filed a notice of appeal timely from
the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration. (R., pp.211-13.)

9

ISSUE
Whether the district court analyzed Mr. Cook’s Motion for Reconsideration under the
wrong standard, and so, erroneously denied that motion.

10

ARGUMENT
The District Court Analyzed Mr. Cook’s Motion For Reconsideration Under The Wrong
Standard, And So, Erroneously Denied That Motion
A.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide for several different types of motions

for reconsideration. For example, a motion for reconsideration can be a motion to alter
or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), or a motion for relief from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding under Rule 60(b). See Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737 (2010);
Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 706 (Ct. App. 2015), rev. denied; cf. Straub v. Smith, 145
Idaho 65, 71 (2007) (explaining the difference between motions to reconsider under
Rule 59 and Rule 11(a)(2)(B)).

Each such motion raises different questions under

different analytical frameworks and so, the district court needs to consider the motion
under the appropriate provision. See, e.g., Bias, 159 Idaho at 706.
The question regarding which of these provisions controls the analysis in a
particular case is a question of law. See Eby, 148 Idaho at 737 (explaining that, when
the district court erred by not analyzing the petitioner’s claims under Rule 60(b), that
demonstrated the “discretion exercised by a trial court is affected by an error of law”).
Therefore, whether the district court evaluated a motion for reconsideration under the
proper provision is a question the appellate courts review de novo. See, e.g., Berkshire
Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 80 (2012) (“The Court reviews questions of
law de novo.”).
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B.

Mr. Cook’s Motion For Reconsideration Should Have Been Evaluated Under
Rule 60(b)
The Court of Appeals has identified two indicators which inform the determination

of which provision controls a given motion for reconsideration: (1) the time in which the
motion was filed, and (2) the substance of the motion. Bias, 159 Idaho at 706. Thus:
A motion is most appropriately considered a motion to alter or amend a
judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) when it is filed within fourteen days of the
entry of judgment and is premised solely upon information that was before
the court at the time judgment was rendered. Conversely, where a motion
presents new information or issues for the court to consider, treatment as
a motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) is most appropriate.
Id. (internal citations omitted). In Mr. Cook’s case, both indicators reveal his motion
should have been analyzed under Rule 60(b), which means the district court erred by
analyzing his motion under Rule 59(e).
In regard to the first Bias indicator, Mr. Cook’s motion was filed one month after
the entry of the Final Judgment was entered. (R., pp.172, 194.) Rule 59(e) motions
must be filed and served no later than fourteen days after the entry of judgment.
I.R.C.P. 59(e). If such a motion “‘was not filed within fourteen days of the entry of
judgment, the court has no power to grant the requested relief.’” Ross v. State, 141
Idaho 670, 672 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Hamilton v. Rybar, 111 Idaho 396, 397 (1986)).
Motions filed under Rule 60(b), on the other hand, need only be filed within a
reasonable time after the entry of judgment. I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1). In fact, for certain types
of Rule 60(b) motions, the rule expressly allows for up to six months to file the motion.
Id. Since Mr. Cook’s motion was filed a month after the Final Judgment, it was filed
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outside the timeframe for Rule 59(e). However, it was filed well within the timeframe for
Rule 60(b). Therefore, under the first Bias indicator, Mr. Cook’s motion was properly
analyzed under Rule 60(b), not Rule 59(e).
In regard to the second Bias indicator, Mr. Cook’s motion for reconsideration was
supported by new evidence, which was offered to support a new claim that Mr. Nelson
had been completely absent in his representation of Mr. Cook.5 (See R., p.195.) As the
Idaho Supreme Court has held, “under Rule 59(e), a movant is not entitled to offer
additional evidence beyond that introduced at trial.”6 Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users
Ass’n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 245 (1993). However, under Rule 60(b), a moving party
is allowed to present new information or issues which had not been before the district
court at the time it entered judgment. Id. (quoting Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 870
(1988)); Bias, 159 Idaho at 706. Claims that counsel was ineffective, by their nature,
will usually not have been before the district court previously.

See, e.g., State v.

Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 913 (Ct. App. 2011) (acknowledging that the usual record of
proceedings before a district court “is rarely adequate for review of such claims” of

5

Claims that a post-conviction attorney was completely absent in his representation of
the petitioner have, at times, been referred to in shorthand, though imprecisely, as
claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. See, e.g., Bias, 159 Idaho at
706.
6
Given that the analysis under Rule 59(e) is limited to the information already in the
record, the district court’s statement in its written order denying Mr. Cook’s motion under
Rule 59 – that “Petitioner has failed to sufficiently support his Motion for
Reconsideration” (R., p.209 (emphasis added)) – is inappropriate. No further support
for such a motion was required, or indeed, permitted, under the analysis the district

13

ineffective assistance of counsel); Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 295-96 (Ct. App.
2004) (explaining that, to make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant will need a forum “where an evidentiary record can be developed”).
Since Mr. Cook’s motion for reconsideration presented several new affidavits to
present evidence in support of his new claim that his attorney, Mr. Nelson, was
completely absent in his representation, his motion for reconsideration is properly
analyzed under Rule 60(b), not Rule 59(e).

If fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has

acknowledged as much: “Given the unique status of a post-conviction proceeding, and
given the complete absence of meaningful representation in the only available
proceeding for [the petitioner] to advance constitutional challenges to his conviction and
sentence, we conclude that this case may present the ‘unique and compelling
circumstances’

in

which

I.R.C.P.

60(b)(6)

relief

may

well

be

warranted.”7

court was using. Thus, even if Rule 59(e) were the controlling provision in this case, the
district court still erred in its analysis of Mr. Cook’s motion under that provision.
7
A claim that post-conviction counsel was “ineffective” by being absent in his
representation is properly raised under Rule 60(b) even though, in Murphy v. State, 156
Idaho 389, 391 (2014), the Idaho Supreme Court held there is no right to counsel in
post-conviction cases. See Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737 (2010) (acknowledging
prior cases holding there is no right to post-conviction counsel before granting relief
under Rule 60(b) anyway); Parvin v. State, 157 Idaho 518, 521 (Ct. App. 2014)
(detailing why the decision in Murphy does not foreclose the relief recognized in Eby),
rev. denied.
In fact, the United States Supreme Court has recently pointed out that the
constitutional question of whether a prisoner has a right to counsel in collateral
proceedings remains open. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) (citing
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991)). The Martinez Court also
suggested there may, in fact, be a right to counsel when post-conviction is the first
opportunity for a defendant to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,

14

Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737 (2010). Thus, the second Bias indicator also reveals
Mr. Cook’s motion should have been analyzed under Rule 60(b).
Since both the Bias indicators reveal Mr. Cook’s motion for reconsideration
should have been analyzed under Rule 60(b), the district court erred by analyzing
Mr. Cook’s motion under Rule 59(e).
C.

Remedy
There appear to be two different approaches to determining whether to grant

relief upon finding the district court erred in its analysis of a motion for reconsideration
vis-à-vis Rule 60(b). Compare Eby, 148 Idaho at 737; with Bias, 159 Idaho at 706.
While Mr. Cook maintains the Eby approach is more appropriate, he is entailed to relief
under either approach.
1.

The Eby Approach: Vacate And Remand So The District Court Can
Evaluate The Claims Under The Proper Standard

In Eby, the Idaho Supreme Court found the district court erred by not analyzing
the petitioner’s claims under Rule 60(b). Eby, 148 Idaho at 737. It proceeded to vacate
the erroneous order denying relief and to remand the case so the district court could

since “a collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct
appeal as to the ineffective assistance claim,” and, “To present a claim of ineffective
assistance at trial in accordance with the State’s procedures, then, a prisoner likely
needs an effective attorney.” Id. at 1317; compare Eby, 148 Idaho at 737 (echoing the
concerns about the lack of meaningful representation in post-conviction proceedings,
the defendant’s only opportunity to advance certain constitutional challenges to his

15

consider the claim under the appropriate provision. Eby, 148 Idaho at 737. The reason
it did so is that Rule 60(b) “is a matter of discretion for the district court,” and:
This Court has held that when the discretion exercised by a trial court is
affected by an error of law, our role is to note the error made and remand
the case for appropriate findings. In this case, unless there is an
alternative ground for upholding the district court’s decision, this matter
must be remanded to the district court for that court to exercise its
discretion in determining whether [the petitioner] is entitled to relief.
Id. (internal quotation omitted); compare Southern Idaho Production Credit Ass’n v.
Gneiting, 109 Idaho 493, 495 (1985) (explaining that, even though the moving party’s
case for relief under Rule 60(b) was, in the Court’s opinion, “doubtful in the extreme,”
the improper denial of Rule 60(b) relief in that case would still be reversed because “it is
the policy in Idaho that relief is favored in doubtful cases. It is further the policy of this
Court to prefer adjudication upon merits rather than adjudication upon default”) (internal
citation omitted).8 Since the district court erred by not analyzing Mr. Cook’s motion
under Rule 60(b), the proper remedy under Eby is to vacate the erroneous order
denying that motion and remand this case so that the district court can make findings
under Rule 60(b).

conviction and sentence); see also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (applying
Martinez to a post-conviction system similar to Idaho’s).
8
The Gneiting Court “restrict[ed] the precedential value of this opinion to its facts and
circumstances.” Gneiting, 109 Idaho at 494. As such, Gneiting does not dictate the
result in other, similar cases. However, its process of analysis still remains a useful
example of how to analyze the facts and law in this context. See, e.g., Staff of Idaho
Real Estate Comm’n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (explaining even
“consideration of [an] unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an example,
was appropriate”).
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2.

The Bias Approach: Evaluate Whether There Is Merit To The Claims
Under Rule 60(b) Before Remanding

In Bias, the Court of Appeals found the district court erred by considering a
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) instead of Rule 60(b). Bias, 159 Idaho at
706. However, unlike Eby, the Bias Court examined whether the petitioner’s claims
actually had merit under Rule 60(b) before deciding whether to grant relief. Bias, 159
Idaho at 706-07; see also Reeves v. Wisenor, 102 Idaho 271, 272 (1981) (refusing to
remand a case under Rule 60(b) due to a notice violation because “no real justiciable
controversy,” no meritorious defense to summary dismissal, had been shown by the
moving party). Because the Bias Court concluded the claims in that case did not have
merit, it held that was an alternative legal theory upon which it could affirm the district
court’s otherwise-erroneous order denying the motion for reconsideration. Bias, 159
Idaho at 706-07. If that is, in fact, the proper analysis, this Court should still vacate the
order denying Mr. Cook’s motion for reconsideration because his claims have merit
under Rule 60(b) in several respects. First, Mr. Cook’s allegation that Mr. Nelson failed
to file additional evidence in support of the petition is a viable claim under Rule 60(b)(6).
Second, Mr. Cook’s allegation that Mr. Nelson failed to file a viable motion to reconsider
under Rule 11(a)(2)(B)9 at Mr. Cook’s request is a viable claim under Rule 60(b)(1).

9

Although Mr. Cook specifically contended Mr. Nelson should have filed a motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)(B) (R., p.195), since the Final Judgment
issued immediately after the summary dismissal order (see R., pp.162, 72), such a
motion would have needed to be brought under Rule 59(e) instead of Rule 11(a)(2)(B).
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The first claim, viable under Rule 60(b)(6), is based on Mr. Nelson’s failure to file
anything in response to the pending summary dismissal motion. That claim is almost
identical to the claim which the Idaho Supreme Court found to have merit in Eby. In
Eby, counsel was appointed after the petitioner filed a pro se petition. Eby, 148 Idaho at
733. Initially-appointed counsel filed no additional information in support of the petition,
and eventually, the case was transferred to another attorney. Id. The new attorney
represented, in response to several notices of pending summary dismissal issued over
the course of several years, that he “conducted a ‘review, investigation, research and
analysis of post-conviction issues’ and assured the court he would file an amended
petition.” Id. However, the new attorney never actually filed anything in support of the
petition. Id. The petition was summarily dismissed as a result. Id. That, the Idaho
Supreme Court explained, was sufficient to make out a claim “in which I.R.C.P. 60(b)
relief may well be warranted” (i.e., the claim had merit under Rule 60(b)). Id. at 737.
Like in Eby, the district court appointed counsel to represent Mr. Cook on his pro
se motion and petition. (R., p.89) Like in Eby, that initial attorney, Mr. Grove, did not
file anything in support of the petition, and the case was eventually transferred to a new
attorney. (See R., p.155; see generally R.) Like in Eby, the new attorney, Mr. Nelson,
told the court that he was investigating potential issues and intended to file documents

Straub, 145 Idaho at 71 (noting the difference between the two rules). That distinction
does not, however, deprive Mr. Cook’s claim of merit. See id. (considering the merits of
the motion in question under Rule 59(e) even though the motion had specifically
invoked Rule 11(a)(2)(B)).
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in support of Mr. Cook’s petition.

(R., p.156.) Like in Eby, the issue of summary

dismissal had been pending for a while, as the prosecutor noted it had been “noticed up
a couple different times prior to the extension” to allow Mr. Nelson to act. (2/8/16 Tr.,
p.5, Ls.10-11.)

Like in Eby, Mr. Nelson never actually filed anything in support of

Mr. Cook’s petition. (See 2/8/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.20-25; see generally R.) Like in Eby, the
petition was summarily dismissed as a result. (See 2/8/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.3-17.) Therefore,
Mr. Cook’s claim had the same merit under Rule 60(b) as did the claim in Eby.
In fact, the record shows there was new information Mr. Nelson could have
presented in support of Mr. Cook’s petition.

As substitute counsel, Mr. Carpenter

demonstrated, it was possible to secure appropriate affidavits which specifically
addressed the district court’s concerns with the initial petition: what theory of defense
trial counsel should have pursed, who the witnesses he should have interviewed were,
and what their testimony would have been. (Compare R., pp.122-23 (the district court
articulating its concerns); with Aug. pp.4-5, 8-17 (affidavits of Mr. Ames and Robert
Cook which speak to those concerns).) That further demonstrates that Mr. Cook’s first
claim has merit under Rule 60(b).
The second claim, viable under Rule 60(b)(1), is based on Mr. Nelson’s failure to
file a motion for reconsideration of the order summarily dismissing the petition at
Mr. Cook’s request. Rule 60(b)(1) allows a party to claim relief from a judgment on the
grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, provided the moving
party also “plead[s] facts which, if established, would constitute a defense to the action.”
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Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 289 (2009) (internal quotation omitted); cf. Baldwin
v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008) (explaining a post-conviction petition need only
show a genuine issue of material fact – that, with all the facts and inferences in the
record considered in the light most favorable to the petitioner, he would be entitled to
relief – to survive summary dismissal). Counsel’s failure to reasonably act to prevent
improper default judgment constitutes excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1).

See,

e.g., Jonsson v. Oxborrow, 141 Idaho 635, 638-39 (2005) (finding excusable neglect
when the party reasonably relied on an agent to find him an attorney to respond to a
lawsuit, but the agent failed to do so, resulting in default judgment against the party);
compare Gneiting, 109 Idaho at 494 (explaining that, where counsel failed to respond
reasonably to pending default judgment, the Supreme Court would not “visit the sins of
the attorney upon the head of his clients,” and thus, found the moving party had shown
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1)).
The alleged facts, if established, would show Mr. Cook timely instructed, and
thus, reasonably relied on, his attorney, Mr. Nelson, to file a motion for reconsideration
of the order summarily dismissing his petition. (See R., p.198.) Therefore, Mr. Cook
would have a meritorious claim under Rule 60(b)(1) if the facts, if established, would
also show the requested motion for reconsideration would have had merit.
The facts show Mr. Cook would have had a meritorious claim under Rule 59(e).
One of the arguments a party can make under Rule 59(e) is to alert the district court to
a fact in the record which was apparently omitted in the decision, but which, if taken into

20

account, could change the district court’s conclusions.

Straub, 145 Idaho at 71

(explaining that such a claim “specified a sufficient basis for the [Rule 59(e)] motion and
relief sought”). The facts in the record – namely, the sworn statements of Nathan Ames
and Robert Cook which were filed with Mr. Cook’s motion for appointment of conflict
counsel and after the district court issued its Notice of Intent To Dismiss – do precisely
that.
Mr. Ames’ sworn statement revealed that trial counsel was supposed to have
interviewed Mr. Ames, but had not. (R., p.144.) It also revealed that, had Mr. Ames
been interviewed by trial counsel, he could have provided information refuting certain
evidentiary points, such as, that he, Mr. Ames, had told officers Mr. Cook had not been
riding the motorcycle the police had been pursuing. (R., p.144.) Furthermore, Robert
Cook attested there were witnesses who could have testified that Mr. Cook had not
been at the Rodeo Bar, as he had been working on a motorcycle at Mr. Ames’ house.
(R., p.140.)

Together, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Cook, those two

statements reveal that Nathan Ames was a potential witness with knowledge of
potentially-exculpatory information that was relevant to an alibi defense, and that trial
counsel was aware of, but did not interview, Mr. Ames. Additionally, Robert Cook’s
affidavit reveals he could have provided additional testimony supporting that theory of
defense, as he could testify that Mr. Cook’s motorcycle had a rear license plate.
(R., p.140; compare Exhibits, p.39 (the initially-pursuing officer describing the suspect
motorcycle as not having a rear license plate).)
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As such, those sworn statements

provided precisely the information which the district court had said was missing from the
original petition: the identity of the potential witnesses, the nature of their testimony,
and the defense theory their testimony would support. (See R., pp.122-23.)
Therefore, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Cook, those sworn
statements show a genuine issue of material fact on the underlying question – whether
trial counsel was ineffective for not interviewing known witnesses about potentiallyexculpatory information. Compare Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649, 654 (Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that where there is “no explanation why such potentially exculpatory and easily
obtainable information was not pursued” by trial counsel, particularly when that
information could disprove one of the components of the State’s case, allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel for a failure to interview potential witnesses raise
genuine issues of material fact). Therefore, the facts, if established, would show a
defense to summary dismissal, meaning a Rule 59(e) motion would have had merit.
Since a Rule 59(e) motion would have had merit, Mr. Cook’s second claim had merit
under Rule 60(b)(1).
Since Mr. Cook’s Rule 60(b) motion has merit in regard to either of those claims,
even under the Bias remedy framework, this Court should grant relief because the
district court erroneously denied Mr. Cook’s Motion for Reconsideration.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Cook respectfully requests this Court vacate the order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of January, 2017.
______/S/___________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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